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Appendix
Consider the dispersed solution a
0
= b
0
= (γ − 2) (t− 2) /4γt. We have already
verified that it satisfies the SOCs for all non-negative values of γ, and the
feasibility requirements for t ≥ tmin = 2 (2− γ) / (γ + 2). Now we have to
check under which conditions it is also consistent and deviation-proof. Since
the locations corresponding to (6) respectively maximize (3) and (4), which
assume duopolistic interaction over the entire market, consistency requires that
from those locations both firms deliver positive quantities at all sites. Given
that the site in which each firm delivers the lowest quantity is the opposite
endpoint of the market segment, this requirement is met if, e.g., the quantity
delivered by firm 1, q∗1 = [2− γ + γt |1− b− x|− 2t |a− x|] / (2 + γ) (2− γ) is
positive in x = 1, when evaluated at (6). This is actually verified for t < tcover =
2 (3γ + 2) (γ − 2) /
¡
γ2 − 8γ − 4
¢
, with tcover > tmin for γ ∈ (0, 1].4
Therefore, in the case of substitutability, there is an interval of values of t
for which the dispersed solution is consistent. For it to be a SPNE, however, we
have to prove that for these values of t there is no incentive for one of the two
firms to deviate, thus generating a different pattern of market coverage (with
monopolistic areas for one or both firms). For this purpose we first notice that, if
firm 2 chooses b
0
= (γ − 2) (t− 2) /4γt, for t ∈
£
tmin, 2
¡
γ − γ2 + 2
¢
/ (3γ + 2)
¤
,
the decisions of firm 1 are such that:
(i) if a ∈ ](10t+ 6γ − 12− γt) /8t, (3γt+ 2t+ 2γ − 4) /4γt], the entire market
is covered by both firms and profits of firm 1 are
Π1 (a, γ, t) =
Z 1
0
¡
πD1 (a, b
∗ (γ, t) , γ, t, x)
¢
dx (A1)
(ii)if a ∈
i
1
tγ
³
(2− t) γ−22γ − 2 + γ + 2t
´
, (10t+ 6γ − 12− γt) /8t
i
, firm 2 (but
not firm 1) is monopolist in a segment external to its location and at the extreme
of its market side; profits of firm 1 are therefore
Π1 (a, γ, t) =
Z ρ1
0
¡
πD1 (a, b
∗ (γ, t) , γ, t, x)
¢
dx (A2)
(iii) if a ∈
i¡
2t+ 3γt− 4− 2γ + 2γ2
¢
/4γt, 1tγ
³
(2− t) γ−22γ − 2 + γ + 2t
´i
, both
firms are monopolist in a segment external to their location and at the extreme
of their market sides; in this case we have that
Π1 (a, γ, t) =
Z ρ2
0
¡
πM1 (a, γ, t)
¢
dx+
Z ρ1
ρ2
¡
πD1 (a, b
∗ (γ, t) , γ, t, x)
¢
dx (A3)
(iv) if a ∈
£
0,
¡
2t+ 3γt− 4− 2γ + 2γ2
¢
/4γt
¤
, both firms are monopolist in a
segment in their market side which includes their locations, so that
Π1 (a, γ, t) =
Z ρ3
0
πM1 (a, t, x) dx+
Z ρ4
ρ3
¡
πD1 (a, b
∗ (γ, t) , γ, t, x)
¢
dx (A4)
4We would have obtained the same condition by setting q∗2 > 0 in x = 0.
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where the options (iii) and (iv) are viable only if t > 2
¡
γ − γ2 + 2
¢
/ (3γ + 2),
a threshold value which belongs to [tmin, tcover],5 and
ρ1 =
12− 6γ − 3γt− 2t+ 8at
4 (2− γ) t , ρ2 =
2− γ − 2t+ (t− 2) γ−22γ + γta
(γ − 2) t
ρ3 =
γ − 2 + 2t− (t− 2) γ−22γ + γta
(γ + 2) t
, ρ4 =
2− γ + γt− 14 (t− 2) (γ − 2) + 2ta
(γ + 2) t
are the relevant boundary points between the sections of the segment with
different coverage configurations, Clearly, πM1 (a, t, x) = (1− t (a− x) /2)
2 is
the monopoly profit at a location x.
By substituting for πD1 (a, b
∗ (γ, t) , γ, t, x) and πM1 (a, t, x) in the above ex-
pressions, it is easy to check that for both intervals of t the profit function
is continuous overall. Moreover, tedious but straightforward calculations show
that the profit functions (A2), (A3) and (A4) have no local maxima in their
domain. This implies that the maximum a
0
= (γ − 2) (t− 2) /4γt of the profit
function (A1) is not only consistent (i.e. belongs to the domain of that function),
but is also a global maximum.
A similar procedure can be applied also to the agglomerated equilibrium.
5Notice that for t = 2
¡
γ − γ2 + 2
¢
/ (3γ + 2), the lower bound of the interval in (ii) is
equal to zero.
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Figure 1. The pattern of the dispersed equilibrium
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